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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the impact of government control on investors’ valuation of 
cash held by listed firms in China. We find strong and robust evidence that government 
control leads to a lower value of cash. Further evidence suggests that this negative impact 
is associated with significant agency costs of political expropriation rather than low finan-
cial constraints of the soft-budget effect. Moreover, our extended analyses reveal that the 
negative impact of government control on the value of cash depends on regional institu-
tional development. In particular, in regions with high institutional development, govern-
ment control reduces the value of cash, while in areas that are less developed, this negative 
impact is attenuated to some extent. Overall, our findings shed new light and add a fur-
ther dimension to the literature, broadening our understanding of the impact of government 
intervention on the listed firms under its control.
Keywords Government control · Value of cash · Political expropriation · China
JEL Classification G30 · G32 · G34
1 Introduction
Despite the large wave of privatization that started in the United Kingdom in the 1980s 
and then spread across the globe during the 1990s, government control over listed firms 
is still pervasive, especially in the emerging markets in general and the Chinese market in 
particular (Boubakri et  al. 2018). The recent financial crisis, associated with worldwide 
government intervention, has provoked the debate over government involvement in firms’ 
business decisions, and two competing views emerge. On the one hand, government con-
trol can be detrimental to firm value due to its social and political motives, which can lead 
to inefficiencies (Boycko et al. 1996; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). On the other hand, gov-
ernment connections may bring benefits to firms under its control by providing them with 
rents and protection such as implicit bailout guarantee, preferential access to credit and 
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government-related contracts (Kornai et al. 2003; Borisova et al. 2015). Given the theoreti-
cal benefits and costs of government intervention, there is significant conflicting evidence 
in the literature on the relationship between government control and firm value (Boubakri 
et al. 2005; Chen et al. 2009; Liu et al. 2012; Beuselinck et al. 2017; Boubakri et al. 2018).
In this study, we aim to add to this debate by investigating how government control 
influences firm value through its impact on cash held by firms within the context of China, 
the world’s largest emerging economy. We are particularly interested in China as it offers 
a suitable setting for studying this topic. China is characterized by government control as 
the majority of listed firms are former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that were privatized 
through the share offering. Although the Chinese government gradually sold its ownership 
of listed firms to the private sector in recent years, the state still retains as an influential 
shareholder in many listed firms. For instance, around 54% of firms in our sample are still 
ultimately controlled by the government. When the state serves as the controlling share-
holder, their socio-economic goals may influence firms’ strategic objectives and financial 
decisions, leading to a different aspect of agency costs, in contrast to private owners.
Cash holdings are one of the most important corporate resources and account for a 
significant proportion of firm assets. Cash enables firms to finance profitable investment 
without resorting to external finance, which is especially valuable during the financially 
constrained period (Opler et al. 1999; Almeida et al. 2004). On the other hand, compared 
with hard assets, cash reserves can be easily diverted by corporate insiders with little scru-
tiny for private benefits that come at a cost to outside shareholders (Jensen 1986; Myers 
and Rajan 1998). Consequently, how market participants value cash held by firms reflects 
the perceived use of this type of assets, which largely depends on corporate financial con-
straints and agency costs (Faulkender and Wang 2006; Pinkowitz et  al. 2006; Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Denis and Sibilkov 2009). However, one potential and important 
determinant that may affect investors’ valuation on cash is government control, which is 
not well explored in the literature, especially the way(s) in which government control may 
influence the valuation of cash and how institutional development may moderate the asso-
ciation between government control and the value of cash. These are the questions that 
motivate the present study.
This paper is related to the study of Megginson et al. (2014), who examine the impact 
of state ownership on the level, as well as the value, of cash for listed firms in China. They 
demonstrate, in particular, that the value of cash decreases with state ownership. Our paper 
extends beyond their work in several ways. First, Megginson et al. (2014) focus on state 
ownership measured by the percentage of shares owned by the government. However, this 
measurement may underestimate the controlling power of the state, since many state agen-
cies and SOEs exert control indirectly through control rights. Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) 
suggest that ultimate control can provide a better picture of government power on firms 
under its control. Therefore, in this paper, we chase up the identity of the ultimate con-
trolling shareholders and use a number of measurements to proxy ultimate control by the 
government, as opposed to direct ownership. Second, Megginson et  al. (2014) maintain 
that the value-destroying effect is due to the soft-budget constraints inherited in state own-
ership without empirically testing for this premise. The current research seeks to discover 
the mechanisms underlying such relationship by analyzing and distinguishing two possible 
channels: the agency costs of political expropriation and the financial constraints of the 
soft-budget effect.
Third, the present paper explores how the relationship between government con-
trol and the value of cash may be conditional on the quality of the institutional environ-
ment. As to the benefits and costs of government control, the extant literature based on 
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the cross-country setting is rather mixed, perhaps partially due to the omitted-variable and 
aggregation biases present in cross-country studies. In the case of China, following almost 
four decades of the economic reform, the disparity of institutional development and great 
heterogeneity in legal systems across various regions in the country have become increas-
ingly significant (Chen and Zheng 2008). Given the country’s large size and geographical 
diversity, it thus offers a natural experiment to explore, within a single-country setting, 
how regional differences in institutional development may facilitate the role of government 
control through investors’ valuations on corporate cash reserves in listed firms. Therefore, 
China is an ideal setting to test the hypotheses proposed in this study.
Using an unbalanced panel consisting of 19,340 firm-year observations from 2430 
unique listed firms in China over the period 2003–2015, we find that government control 
reduces the value of cash. Economically, an extra unit (RMB) of cash held in a state-con-
trolled firm is, on average, valued at 0.25 (RMB) less than that is held in a privately con-
trolled firm. The result is robust to a battery of additional tests, including year, firm and 
industry fixed effects, alternative measures of government control and expected change in 
cash, and is insensitive to the inclusion of a set of corporate governance variables. Further-
more, our result remains valid after the endogeneity concern is addressed, based on various 
approaches, such as using lagged variables to proxy for government control, a propensity-
score matched (PSM) sample and focusing on the firms that have gone through the change 
from state control to private control during the sample period.
Moreover, our evidence suggests that the channel through which government control 
lowers the value of cash is mainly due to the agency costs of political expropriation rather 
than the financial constraints of the soft-budget effect. Specifically, our results reveal that 
cash is more likely to be disgorged in investment with few growth opportunities (Tobin’s 
Q), and is used less in innovation activities, such as research and development (R&D), in 
firms under government control than their counterparts under private control. This implies 
that cash holdings in government-controlled firms are invested in projects mostly for politi-
cal considerations. The market, accordingly, discounts the value of cash significantly in 
these firms. However, we find no evidence of the financial constraints of the soft-budget 
effect. Government control neither alleviates financial constraints nor enhances external 
financing abilities in listed firms under its control.
Lastly, we find that the association between government control and the value of cash 
is conditional on the level of the institutional quality across the regions within the country. 
Specifically, we find that the negative impact of government control is somewhat attenu-
ated in regions with low market development and poor government quality. The evidence 
appears to support the “helping hand” of the government that has, indeed, adopted a series 
of subsidization programs in order to tackle the regional disparity in recent years. There-
fore, the costs of government control appear to be alleviated by the benefits received in 
these regions.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this study adds to the recent 
debate over the effect of government control on firm value (Chen et  al. 2009; Liu et  al. 
2012; Beuselinck et al. 2017; Boubakri et al. 2018), by focusing on the investors’ valua-
tion of cash. First, we focus on the ultimate control by the government, a measurement that 
avoids the underestimation problem of state direct ownership, which is important for Chi-
nese listed firms because the state and related agencies exert control indirectly over listed 
firms. Therefore, it complements the findings of Pinkowitz et al. (2006) and Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith (2007) on corporate governance and extends their arguments to government 
control, one of the most important characteristics in transitional economies. More impor-
tantly, our study helps facilitate a better understanding of the mechanisms that underlie the 
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relationship that we document by demonstrating that the value-destroying effect is mainly 
due to the agency costs of political expropriation associated with their socio-economic 
objectives. This is consistent with recent evidence that government ownership does not 
necessarily decrease the cost of capital or enhance financing ability (Ben-Nasr et al. 2012; 
Firth et al. 2012; Borisova et al. 2015; Jaslowitzer et al. 2016).
Second, our paper adds to the literature relating to the institutional quality on firms’ 
financing decisions by providing evidence of their conditional effect on the relationship 
between government control and the value of cash. Prior research based on a cross-coun-
try study provides mixed evidence regarding the benefits and costs of government own-
ership (Guedhami et  al. 2009; Beuselinck et  al. 2017; Boubakri et  al. 2018). We extend 
this literature by focusing on a single-country setting that can avoid some potential issues 
encountered in cross-country studies. Our findings shed new insights that broaden our 
understanding of the role of the government. In particular, firms located in regions with 
less developed institutions benefit more from the government owing to its series of devel-
opment programs, and therefore the negative effect of government control due to political 
objectives is mitigated to some extent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the 
relevant literature and develops the hypothesis, with research design presented in Sect. 3. 
Section 4 includes the main results and robustness tests. Section  5 discusses the role of 
institutional development, and Sect. 6 concludes the paper.
2  Literature and hypothesis
2.1  The value of cash holdings
Cash is an important and valuable asset to firms, especially when other sources of finance, 
such as cash flows, debts and equity issuances, are insufficient to finance profitable invest-
ment. Liquid assets enable firms to hedge against the changes in growth opportunities and 
negative cash flow shocks (Opler et al. 1999; Almeida et al. 2004; Acharya et al. 2007). 
Cash is especially important for financially constrained firms, as it can help constrained 
firms to undertake profitable projects that might otherwise be bypassed. Consistent with 
this view, studies find that cash holdings are more valuable to investors for firms with high 
financial constraints (Faulkender and Wang 2006; Denis and Sibilkov 2009).
However, one severe cost of cash reserves is related to agency problems. Although 
many kinds of assets can be turned into private benefits, cash reserves are especially at 
risk. Compared with hard assets, such as property, plant, equipment (PPE) and inventories, 
cash holdings can be easily extracted by self-interested managers and controlling share-
holders to pursue their personal benefits at the expense of minority shareholders’ interests 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers and Rajan 1998). When investors anticipate that corpo-
rate insiders may use cash holdings for private benefits, they would attach a lower value to 
cash holdings in such firms, leading to a substantial value destruction pertaining to agency 
problems. In line with the argument, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) find that cash is worth much 
lower in countries with lower investor protection. Using management entrenchment and 
shareholder activism as proxies for corporate governance, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) 
show that the marginal value of cash, as well as the value of excess cash, is higher in well 
governed firms than in poorly governed firms. Lee and Lee (2009) find that the negative 
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relationship between firm value and cash holdings is more pronounced in poorly governed 
firms, measured by board independence, board size and managerial entrenchment.
2.2  Government control
In an agency framework, government ownership is associated with political interven-
tion and inefficiency. The “grabbing hands” of the government described by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998) show how firms’ resources may be diverted to achieve political objectives 
or social welfare, such as maintaining a high level of employment and preserving social 
stability, rather than shareholders’ wealth maximization (Boycko et al. 1996; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). In addition, the agency costs of government control may exist in another 
way, because managers of government-controlled firms are typically entrenched and may 
exploit their positions and collude with the government to expropriate corporate resources 
for their own personal agendas and political advantages (Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Shleifer 
1998). Therefore, governance mechanisms are poor, and the agency costs of managers are 
severe in government-controlled firms (Vickers and Yarrow 1991). In line with this view, 
empirical studies find that government ownership leads to investment inefficiency and poor 
performance in the cross-country setting (Megginson and Netter 2001; Boubakri et  al. 
2005, 2008; Jaslowitzer et  al. 2016; Chen et  al. 2017) and in China (Chen et  al. 2008, 
2011b; Firth et al. 2012). If the high agency costs associated with political objectives exist, 
it may inversely affect the value of cash held by firms due to the ineffective use of cash 
perceived by investors.
Another strand of research documents that firms with government involvement are less 
subject to the threat of financial distress due to the implicit government support and the 
ineffective discipline imposed by market investors (Megginson and Netter 2001). Com-
pared with private owners, the government can deploy fiscal means, credits and indirect 
support whenever an SOE falls into financial distress, and firms under its control are usu-
ally subject to soft-budget constraints. Earlier empirical studies have found that firms with 
more government ownership receive a disproportionally large share of credit and a low 
cost of capital (Charumilind et al. 2006; Borisova and Megginson 2011). However, recent 
evidence in the literature casts doubt on the benefits of government ownership on corporate 
financing ability. For example, Ben-Nasr et al. (2012) maintain that government ownership 
is associated with higher cost of equity due to the agency risk. Similarly, Borisova et al. 
(2015) document that government ownership increases the cost of debt in normal periods, 
consistent with state-induced investment distortions. Jaslowitzer et al. (2016) further show 
that government ownership does not mitigate firms’ financial constraints. Whether firms 
under government control are subject to low levels of financial constrains is still under 
academic debate. In terms of China, prior literature has shown that SOEs receive a large 
share of credits (Cull and Xu 2003; Gordon and Li 2003) and face a lower degree of finan-
cial constraints than non-state-owned firms (Guariglia et al. 2011), whereas recent litera-
ture finds no such evidence (Firth et al. 2012; Lin and Bo 2012). Importantly, large cash 
holdings enable firms to finance investment projects without resorting to external finance 
(Faulkender and Wang, 2006). Therefore, if government control is associated with low 
financial constraints, the marginal value of cash should be lower in firms under government 
control than those under private control.
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Taken together, both the agency costs of political expropriation and the financial con-
straints of the soft-budget effect imply a negative impact of government control on the 
value of cash, which leads to our first testable hypothesis, below.
H1: The value of cash is lower in firms controlled by the government than in firms con-
trolled by private owners.
2.3  The role of institutional development
The level of institutional development has been considered to be one of the important factors 
that may affect the impact of government control on corporate policies (La Porta et al. 1999, 
2002). The extant literature is largely based on the evidence within the cross-country context, 
although the results are far from conclusive. For example, Borisova et al. (2012) show that 
government ownership improves (deteriorates) corporate governance in common-law (civil-
law) countries, suggesting the relative benefits of government ownership in regions with better 
investor protection. Similar findings are also reported by Beuselinck et al. (2017) and Bou-
bakri et al. (2018). Another strand of scholarship finds, on the contrary, that firms benefit from 
close connections to the state and politicians in both developed and developing countries, and 
the benefits are found to be generally more pronounced in markets with relatively low institu-
tional development and weak legal systems (Faccio 2006; Boubakri et al. 2012, 2013b). How-
ever, what is unclear in the extant literature is how government control in corporate decisions 
may depend on the institutional development within a single-country setting. Given the issues 
encountered in a cross-country setting, such as an inability to control for the variation in cul-
ture and policy changes, this is another research gap that we intend to address in this study.
In China, fiscal decentralization from central to local governments—since the economic 
reform began in 1978—has created well documented regional imbalances across its 31 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, with the coastal provinces being much 
advanced than the interior provinces. For example, the average gross regional product (GRP) 
per capita was RMB 76,549.38 for the most developed province (Beijing) and RMB 13,927.39 
for the less developed western region (Guizhou) during our sample period. The vast regional 
disparities are primarily attributed to development policies implemented by the govern-
ment, which were in favor of the coastal areas in the earlier stage of the reform, and which 
have accelerated since the early 1990s. In order to improve regional development and reduce 
regional differences, the government plays as a more instrumental role in introducing a series 
of development programs, such as the western development strategy launched in late 1990; 
the north-east revival strategy in 2003; and the rise of central China in more recent years, 
which help to enhance economic development in less developed provinces (Chen and Zheng 
2008). Thus, it is likely that firms controlled by the government in less developed regions will 
receive more economic rents due to the favorable shift of financing contracts and financial 
subsidies from the state, which may alleviate the negative impact of investors’ valuation on 
cash in regions with low institutional development and weak legal systems. Therefore, our 
second testable hypothesis is stated below.
H2: The negative impact of government control on the value of cash is attenuated in 
regions with less developed institutions.
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3  Research design
3.1  Sample
Our sample includes all A-share firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) during the period 2003–2015. The sample period 
starts in 2003, which is the year when Chinese listed firms were required to disclose their 
controlling shareholders in annual reports, the information required to identify whether a 
firm is controlled by the state or by a private owner. Financial data is extracted from the 
China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. We follow custom-
ary practices to exclude firms in the financial industry. We then delete firm-year observa-
tions with missing stock returns and negative equities and net assets (i.e. total assets minus 
cash and cash equivalents). All firms included in the sample have an ultimate controlling 
shareholder, either the state or a private owner. Firm-year observations with no or multiple 
types of ultimate controlling shareholders are also excluded.1 An included firm is required 
to have more than two consecutive years of data. Our final unbalanced panel consists of 
19,340 firm-year observations with 2430 unique firms.
3.2  Measurement of government control
Government control is measured according to the ultimate control right, as opposed to 
direct government ownership. Since the state can exert control indirectly through con-
trol rights, using ultimate control can better capture the extent of state influence on firms’ 
financial decisions than ownership (Bortolotti and Faccio 2009). For each year, the type of 
ultimate controlling shareholder is identified from annual reports. A firm is classified as 
government-controlled if it is ultimately controlled by the state or state agencies, such as a 
state asset-management bureau, or a state-owned enterprise. Otherwise, it is classified as a 
firm controlled by private owners.2 We define a dummy variable, GOV, which is equal to 
one for government-controlled firms, and zero for privately controlled firms.
In the robustness test, three alternative measures of government control are constructed 
in order to further determine the effective control of the state at the ultimate level. The first 
and second alternative measures, GOV1 and GOV2, are defined as dummy variables taking 
the value of one if the government’s ultimate control right is greater than 10% and 20% 
(Claessens et al. 2002), respectively, and zero otherwise, and the third alternative measure, 
following Boubakri et al. (2018), is a continuous variable, GOV_cont, defined as the state’s 
ultimate control rights in government-controlled firms, which is determined by the weakest 
link along the control chain, and zero for privately controlled firms.
1 268 firm-year observations were excluded due to no or multiple types of ultimate controlling sharehold-
ers.
2 Privately controlled firms include a few firms controlled by foreign investors.
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3.3  Model specification
We investigate the effect of government control on the value of cash based on a model akin 
to that of Faulkender and Wang (2006)3:
where the dependent variable, r
i,t − R
B
i,t
 , is the change in firm value, measured by excess 
stock return, calculated as the stock return for firm i minus the return of stock i’s bench-
mark portfolio over fiscal year t. The benchmark portfolios are 25 Fama and French portfo-
lios formed on size and book-to-market ratio.4 ∆ refers to the change of a variable between 
two consecutive years. CASH is cash and cash equivalents. Similar to Faulkender and Wang 
(2006), we first use the realized change in cash, on the assumption that the expected change 
is zero. Three alternative definitions of expected change in cash are used in the robustness 
test. GOV represents government control. Control variables include earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT), net assets (NA), interest expenses (INT), common dividends paid (DIV), 
total debts divided by the market value of equity (MLEV) and net equity and debt financing 
(NF). All variables except for GOV and MLEV are deflated by the one-year lagged market 
value of equity. The full variable description is shown in Table 1.
Our variables of interest are the change in cash (∆CASH) and its interaction with gov-
ernment control (∆CASH × GOV). Since excess stock return and the change in cash are 
both normalized by the previous year’s market value of equity, the coefficient on ∆CASH 
measures the change in shareholder value following one unit change in cash held by the 
firm (i.e. the marginal value of cash). The effect of government control on the value of cash 
is determined by the coefficient on the interaction between the change in cash and govern-
ment control (β2). According to our first hypothesis, an extra unit of cash added to the firm 
will result in a smaller increase in market value if the firm is controlled by the state, which 
predicts a negative coefficient on β2.
3.4  Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the main variables. As shown in Panel A, the mean 
of government control is 52.4%, suggesting that over half of the listed firms in China are ulti-
mately controlled by the state during our sample period. This figure is much lower than what 
is reported in prior studies (Chen et al. 2011b; Firth et al. 2012). This difference is due to 
the increase in newly listed privately controlled firms, especially from 2008 onwards. In addi-
tion, the distributional characteristics of the control variables in our model are similar to the 
US-based data (Faulkender and Wang 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Chou and Feng 
2019) and China-based data (Megginson et al. 2014; Xu et al. 2016).
(1)
r
i,t − R
B
i,t
= 훽0 + 훽1ΔCASHi,t + 훽2ΔCASHi,t × GOVi,t + 훽3ΔEBITi,t + 훽4ΔNAi,t
+ 훽5ΔINTi,t + 훽6ΔDIVi,t + 훽7CASHi,t−1 + 훽8MLEVi,t + 훽9NFi,t
+ 훽10CASHi,t−1 × ΔCASHi,t + 훽11MLEVi,t × ΔCASHi,t + 훽12GOVi,t
+ 휀
i,t
4 Since there are no Fama and French portfolios available for Chinese stock markets, we follow Fama and 
French (1993) and classify firms into one of 25 portfolios based on the intersections between the market 
value of equity and book-to-market ratio quintiles independently at the beginning of each year.
3 The change in R&D expenses is excluded from the equation due to missing data in the early sample 
period.
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Table 1  Variable definition
Variable Definition
GOV A dummy variable set to one if the ultimate controller is a government institution, and 
zero otherwise
GOV1 A dummy variable set to one if a government institution ultimately controls the firm at 
above 10% control rights, and zero otherwise
GOV2 A dummy variable set to one if a government institution ultimately controls the firm at 
above 20% control rights, and zero otherwise
GOV_cont Government’s ultimate control rights in government-controlled firms, and zero in pri-
vately controlled firms
State ownership The percentage of legally defined state-owned shares
Transfer A dummy variable set to one in year when firm is transferred to private owners and after-
wards, and zero in years preceding the transformation
r − RB Excess stock return, where r is the stock return and RB is the corresponding benchmark 
portfolio return in the same year
CASH Cash and cash equivalents
MVE The market value of equity
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes
NA Net assets, defined as total assets minus cash and cash equivalents
INT Interest expenses
DIV Cash dividends
MLEV Market leverage, defined as total debts divided by the market value of assets
NF Net financing, defined as the sum of net proceeds from equity and debt issuance
MOWN The percentage of shares owned by managers
INST The percentage of shares owned by domestic mutual funds and QFII
EXCESS The ratio of control rights to cash-flow rights by the ultimate controllers
ANACOV The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following the firm
INCR_INV Increase in investment, defined as a dummy variable set to one if a firm increases invest-
ment in the next year, and zero otherwise; Investment is measured by capital expendi-
ture or the sum of capital expenditure and acquisitions
INCR_RD Increase in R&D, defined as a dummy variable set to one if a firm increases research and 
development expenses in the next year, and zero otherwise
Q Tobin’s q, defined as the market value of equity plus liabilities divided by total assets 
minus intangible assets and goodwill
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets adjusted using the CPI deflator
CF Operating cash flow, defined as net cash flow from operating activities
BLEV Book leverage, defined as total debts divided by the book value of total assets
DIV A dummy variable set to one if the firm pays out dividends, and zero otherwise
SG The growth rate of sales
ROA Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets
MB Market to book ratio, defined as the market value of equity plus total liabilities divided by 
the book value of assets
CAPEX Capital expenditures, defined as cash paid to acquire and construct fixed assets, intangible 
assets and other long-term assets minus the cash received from the disposals of fixed 
assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets
NWC Net working capital, defined as current assets minus cash and cash equivalents minus 
current liabilities
STD Short-term debts
GEI Gross equity issued, defined as the amount of proceeds from equity issues
 X. Yu, P. Wang 
1 3
We split firms into those controlled by the state and by private owners, as shown in Panel 
B, where t- and Wilcoxon-tests are employed to compare the mean and median difference 
of each variable between the two groups, respectively. The government-controlled firms, on 
average, have a relatively higher figure than privately controlled firms for all control variables 
relating to the value of cash, including the change in cash, change in profitability, change in 
interest expenses and market leverage.
Panel C displays the distribution of government control over the sample period. It is worth 
noting that the percentage of shares owned directly by the state declines significantly from 
36.4% in 2003 to only 2.8% in 2015, as shown in Panel C. However, the government still 
retains substantial control of privatized firms as the ultimate controlling shareholder (52.4% 
on average), or through ultimate control rights (21.8% on average). Therefore, it is highly 
likely that using state ownership as a proxy for government control may underestimate the 
influential power of government on firms under its control. All continuous financial variables 
are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level to minimize the effect of outliers.
4  Main results
4.1  Government control and the value of cash
Table 3 reports the estimation results in Panel A and the marginal value of cash calculated 
for an average firm in Panel B.5 The baseline regression, similar to Faulkender and Wang 
(2006), without government control included, is reported in column 1 of Panel A. The 
coefficient estimate shows that an extra unit (RMB) of cash increases shareholder wealth 
Table 1  (continued)
Variable Definition
NDI Net debt issued, defined as the amount of cash received from issuing bonds or obtaining 
bank loans minus repayments
AGE The natural logarithm of one plus the number of years after the initial public offering
MKT The composite NERI index of marketization at the province level
BANK The NERI index of banking liberalization at the province level
GOVT The NERI index of government decentralization in the economy at the province level
FISC The government fiscal condition, measured by local government fiscal revenue divided 
fiscal expenditure at the province level
NADM The government non-arbitrary revenue, measured by the percentage of local government 
non-administrative revenue at the province level
EMP The condition of employment, measured by the employment rate at the province level
GRP The natural logarithm of gross regional product at the province level
GRPGTH The growth rate of gross regional product at the province level
5 Panel B of Table 3 shows the marginal value of cash for an average firm in our sample. It is calculated 
based on the coefficient estimates from Panel A, or more specifically, it equals the coefficient on the change 
in cash plus the sample means of all variables that interact with the change in cash times the corresponding 
interaction coefficients. For example, in the baseline regression, the mean firm has cash holdings of 19.8% 
of lagged market equity and a market leverage of 13.9%. The marginal value of cash is calculated as 1.618 
− 1.472 × 0.198 − 2.352 × 0.139 = 1.00.
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Table 2  Descriptive statistics of main variables
This table provides summary statistics of key variables for the full sample in Panel A and for the govern-
ment-controlled and privately controlled firms in Panel B and mean values of government control and state 
ownership per year in Panel C. Δ indicates the change from the previous year. All variables except MLEV 
are deflated by the lagged market value of equity (MVE). The definitions of all variables are in Table 1. The 
t- and Wilcoxon-tests are employed to compare the mean and median difference of each variable between 
government-controlled firms and privately controlled firms in Panel B
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
Variable N Mean p25 Median p75 SD
Panel A: Full sample
GOV 19,340 0.524 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.499
r − RB 19,340 − 0.010 − 0.284 − 0.081 0.150 0.563
ΔCASH 19,340 0.014 − 0.038 0.003 0.048 0.117
CASH 19,340 0.198 0.079 0.153 0.276 0.159
ΔEBIT 19,340 0.010 − 0.012 0.005 0.026 0.072
ΔNA 19,340 0.161 0.012 0.090 0.227 0.298
ΔINT 19,340 0.002 − 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.010
ΔDIV 19,340 0.001 − 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.013
MLEV 19,340 0.139 0.027 0.107 0.219 0.129
NF 19,340 0.050 − 0.014 0.010 0.092 0.168
Variable Government-controlled
(N = 10,134)
Privately controlled
(N = 9206)
t-value Wilcoxon
Z-value
Mean Median Mean Median
Panel B: Government-controlled and privately controlled firms
r − RB − 0.024 − 0.077 0.005 − 0.086 − 3.67*** − 0.78
ΔCASH 0.023 0.008 0.005 − 0.003 10.79*** 14.42***
CASH 0.194 0.150 0.202 0.158 − 3.32*** − 3.13***
ΔEBIT 0.012 0.006 0.009 0.005 2.75*** 3.27***
ΔNA 0.161 0.083 0.160 0.098 0.12 − 6.04***
ΔINT 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 7.36*** 5.60***
ΔDIV 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 2.11** 0.93
MLEV 0.164 0.139 0.110 0.077 29.84*** 29.31***
NF 0.054 0.012 0.044 0.009 4.17*** 1.61
Year GOV GOV_cont State ownership
Panel C: Mean values of government control and state ownership per year
2003 0.750 0.349 0.364
2004 0.713 0.330 0.354
2005 0.697 0.311 0.339
2006 0.665 0.261 0.288
2007 0.649 0.252 0.256
2008 0.625 0.246 0.218
2009 0.589 0.235 0.121
2010 0.560 0.224 0.089
2011 0.468 0.190 0.062
2012 0.408 0.170 0.048
2013 0.390 0.162 0.036
2014 0.393 0.163 0.032
2015 0.375 0.154 0.028
Average 0.524 0.218 0.139
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by RMB 1.62 if a firm has no cash holdings or debts. As reported in column 1 of Panel B, 
on average, the value of an additional RMB of cash holdings to shareholders in the mean 
firm is RMB 1.00. Our result is very similar to what is found by Faulkender and Wang 
(2006), who report a slightly lower marginal value of cash to shareholders of US $0.94. 
One potential reason for the difference is that firms in China, as in many emerging coun-
tries, regard financial constraints as one of their primary obstacles to funding profitable 
investments, given the country’s high speed of development (Cull et al. 2015). Therefore, 
cash is more valuable to shareholders in China than in the US due to operational considera-
tions and precautionary motives (Faulkender and Wang 2006; Denis and Sibilkov 2009).
All control variables are significant with expected signs, consistent with the literature 
(Faulkender and Wang 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007). Specifically, we find that 
the excess stock return is positively correlated with the change in profitability, the change 
in net assets, the change in interest expenses, the change in dividends and lagged cash hold-
ings; and it is negatively associated with market leverage. The coefficients on the change 
in cash interacted with cash holdings and with market leverage are both significantly nega-
tive, supporting the view that the value of cash decreases as a firm holds more cash and 
debts. The results are plausible, since firms with little or no cash reserves tend to have 
costly access to external finance, thereby benefiting the most from additional liquid assets. 
Similarly, since the likelihood of default increases with the level of debts, the value of cash 
decreases with debts.
In column 2, government control, measured by government dummy, and its interaction 
with the change in cash are included. The coefficient on the interaction term ∆CASH × GOV 
is negative and statistically significant. Economically, an extra unit (RMB) of cash held in 
an average firm controlled by the government is valued RMB 0.25 less than that is held 
in a privately controlled firm. To address the concern of time-specific and time-invariant 
firm- or industry- level factors, we run the fixed effects regression controlling for year and 
industry or firm heterogeneity, as shown in columns 3 and 4, respectively. The results indi-
cate clearly that our main finding continues to hold.
We then partition our sample into government-controlled and privately controlled firms, 
and conduct a subsample analysis as a comparison. The regression results and the differ-
ence of government- and privately controlled firms are shown in columns 5–7. The coef-
ficient on ∆CASH is 1.48 and 1.91 in firms controlled by the government and by private 
owners, respectively. The difference (− 0.43) is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Moreover, the significance and magnitude of the control variables vary across the two sub-
samples. Specifically, firm value, measured as the excess stock return, is less positively 
affected by a change in profitability or change in net assets and is more positively affected 
by a change in dividends and cash holdings in state-controlled firms compared to privately 
controlled ones. The negative effect of market leverage on the excess stock return is weaker 
in state-controlled firms than in privately controlled firms. Interestingly, the value of cash 
decreases less as market leverage increases in state-controlled firms than in privately con-
trolled firms. One possible explanation is that the likelihood of default is low in firms con-
trolled by the state due to the implicit bailout guarantee during distress.
Overall, the evidence presented in this section is in line with our first hypothesis, sug-
gesting that the value of cash is discounted by investors for firms under the government 
control.
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4.2  Robustness tests
4.2.1  Endogeneity concern
In the earlier analysis, we have attempted to mitigate the endogeneity concern using fixed 
effect regressions by controlling for year, industry, or firm heterogeneity, which may allevi-
ate the omitted-variable bias. Our main result is interpreted based on the coefficients on 
the interaction between government control and the change in cash. Cash holdings may 
change substantially over time, but government control may stay relatively stable. There-
fore, if endogeneity exists, it tends to affect the coefficient of government control rather 
than its interaction with the change in cash (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007). Nevertheless, 
we now conduct several additional analyses to further address the possible endogeneity 
concern, as shown below.
First, we use the lagged variable on government control. It is not likely that the lagged 
government control is endogenously determined with the current excess stock return. As 
shown in column 1 of Table 4, the main result remains qualitatively unchanged. Our result 
is also robust using the 2- and 3-year lagged variables on government control.
Second, to control for observable differences in firm and industry attributes, we next 
perform the analysis based on a propensity-score matched sample. We first run a logit 
model regressing the likelihood of a given firm to be controlled by the government on 
firm size, firm age, book-to-market ratio, leverage, return on assets, and year and indus-
try effects. Then, the likelihood (i.e. the propensity score) that a firm is government-con-
trolled is estimated. Each observation in the government-controlled group is matched to an 
observation in the privately controlled group based on the nearest neighbor technique. We 
allow for replacement and require the difference in the propensity scores for each pair to be 
within 0.1% in absolute value. Our final sample comprises 19,594 firm-year observations, 
with 9797 firm-years being controlled by the government and the remaining 9797 firm-
years by private owners.6 The result of using the matched sample is shown in column 2 of 
Table 4. As evident, the negative impact of government control on the value of cash still 
holds.
Finally, we perform an analysis focusing on firms that have undergone through changes 
in their type of ultimate controlling from the state to private owners during the sample 
period, as such a shift may lead to a decrease in agency costs (or an increase in financial 
constraints) that may affect the value of cash. To validate our main finding, reported earlier, 
we expect to observe a positive impact of such a move on the value of cash. During our 
sample period, a total of 187 firms have experienced such transformation, and an indica-
tor, Transfer, is constructed such that it is equal to one in the year when the firm is trans-
ferred to private ownership and afterwards, and zero in years preceding the transformation. 
We re-estimate Eq. (1) by replacing government control (GOV) with the indicator variable, 
Transfer, and report the result in column 3, which shows a significant increase in the value 
of cash following such a transformation from government control into private hands, veri-
fying our main finding—that government control does reduce the value of cash.
6 The number of observations for the matched sample increases to 19,594 since we allow for replacement, 
i.e. we allow a firm in the control group (i.e. privately controlled firms) to be matched with two or more 
firms in the treated group (i.e. government-controlled firms).
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Table 4  Addressing endogenous concern
The table reports the results of addressing endogeneity concerns. The dependent variable is excess stock 
returns (r − RB). Δ indicates the change from the previous year. All variables except GOV, Transfer, and 
MLEV are deflated by the lagged market value of equity (MVE). The definitions of all variables are in 
Table 1. For all regressions, t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
Lagged government 
control
PSM Change of ownership
(1) (2) (3)
ΔCASH 1.892***
(17.18)
1.770***
(10.04)
1.291***
(4.67)
ΔCASH × GOV − 0.285***
(− 3.37)
− 0.403***
(− 3.51)
ΔCASH × Transfer 0.639***
(3.24)
ΔEBIT 1.451***
(17.00)
1.348***
(10.72)
1.074***
(5.63)
ΔNA 0.471***
(17.98)
0.430***
(9.86)
0.498***
(6.92)
ΔINT 0.983*
(1.72)
0.324
(0.31)
− 0.647
(− 0.38)
ΔDIV 2.867***
(7.98)
2.426***
(3.85)
2.275**
(2.30)
CASH 0.181***
(6.39)
0.059
(1.30)
0.135
(1.57)
MLEV − 0.616***
(− 20.05)
− 0.555***
(− 11.59)
− 0.683***
(− 7.69)
NF − 0.024
(− 0.59)
0.041
(0.64)
0.010
(0.08)
ΔCASH × CASH − 1.436***
(− 6.47)
− 1.292***
(− 3.99)
− 2.029***
(− 4.40)
ΔCASH × MLEV − 2.450***
(− 8.52)
− 1.856***
(− 3.81)
− 2.582***
(− 3.48)
GOV − 0.016**
(− 1.98)
− 0.042***
(− 3.88)
Transfer 0.048**
(2.03)
Constant − 0.021
(− 0.81)
− 0.078**
(− 2.44)
− 0.045*
(− 1.66)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.22 0.27 0.25
Observations 18,285 19,594 2208
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4.2.2  Alternative measures of government control and the expected change in cash
To evaluate the sensitivity of our main finding, we re-estimate Eq. (1) using three alterna-
tive measures of government control. The first two, GOV1 and GOV2, are dummies with 
10% and 20% cut-offs of ultimate control right, respectively, and the third, GOV_cont, is 
a continuous measure of government control using ultimate control right. The results are 
reported in columns 1–3 in Table 5.7 We find that our main prediction related to govern-
ment control remains unaffected: The coefficient on the interaction term ∆CASH × GOV is 
negative in all three columns, and is statistically significant at the 1% level for both GOV1 
and GOV2, and at the 10% level for GOV_cont.
Moving to our key independent variable, the change in cash is defined as the unexpected 
change in cash holdings. The results reported thus far assume that the expected change in 
cash is equal to zero, and therefore, the change in cash is, in fact, the realized change in 
cash. Consistent with Faulkender and Wang (2006), we now conduct robustness checks 
using three alternative definitions to measure the expected change in cash, as shown below.
The first measure is the average change in cash of the corresponding benchmark port-
folio over the year (Portf. Ave). It follows that if most firms in the same size and book-to-
market portfolio change cash reserves over the year, such change should be reflected in the 
benchmark return already, and the excess return is one that is not revealed in the bench-
mark return. With respect to two other measures, we adopt two models from Almeida et al. 
(2004) to obtain the expected change in cash. In both cases, changes in cash are regressed 
on factors that represent sources and uses of cash. The unexpected change in cash is meas-
ured as the difference between the actual change in cash and the predicted change in cash 
from the models (i.e. residuals). The first model, ACW (1), is as follows:
where ΔCASH is the change in cash and cash equivalents, CF is cash flow, MB is market-
to-book ratio and SIZE is firm size. All variables are deflated by the lagged market value of 
equity, except for the market-to-book ratio (MB) and firm size (SIZE).
The second model, ACW(2), adds capital expenditures (CAPEX), change in net working 
capital (ΔNWC) and change in short-term debt (ΔSTD), all lagged deflated by the lagged 
market value of equity, as additional explanatory variables. The equation is shown below:
The results are shown in columns 4–6 of Table 5. The expected change in cash is meas-
ured as the portfolio average in column 4, ACW (1) in column 5 and ACW (2) in column 
6. Overall, using different measurements for the expected change in cash generates nearly 
identical results to those reported in Table 3, consistent with Hypothesis 1, that govern-
ment control reduces investors’ valuation of cash held by firms.
(2)ΔCASHi,t = 훼0 + 훼1CFi,t−1 + 훼2MBi,t−1 + 훼3SIZEi,t−1 + 휀i,t
(3)
ΔCASH
i,t = 훼0 + 훼1CFi,t−1 + 훼2MBi,t−1 + 훼3SIZEi,t−1 + 훼4CAPEXi,t−1 + 훼5ΔNWCi,t−1
+ 훼6ΔSTDi,t−1 + 휀i,t
7 To save space, the control variables are not reported in this and following tables, but they are available 
upon request.
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4.2.3  Controlling for corporate governance
To reduce the concern about potential correlated omitted variables, we further examine 
whether our main finding is sensitive to the inclusion of corporate governance variables. 
Three proxies are considered from the aspects of excess control rights, institutional own-
ership and analyst coverage. First, the ratio of control rights to cash-flow rights by the 
ultimate controllers is used to measure excess control rights (Lemmon and Lins 2003; Xu 
et al. 2016). We use 10% as the cut-off point to determine effective control at the ultimate 
level (Claessens et  al. 2002). Large excess control rights entrench the controlling share-
holders and give them the ability to tunnel, while small cash-flow rights limit controlling 
shareholders’ wealth losses from the tunneling. Thus, firms with more excess control rights 
are worse governed.
Second, we follow Firth et al. (2016) and define institutional ownership (INST) as the 
percentage of shares owned by domestic mutual funds and qualified foreign institutional 
investors (QFII). Compared with other institutional investors, such as banks, insurance and 
securities companies, domestic mutual funds and QFII have a higher exit threat and thus 
are more active and effective in monitoring. Finally, analyst coverage (ANACOV) is meas-
ured as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following the firm (Feng 
et  al. 2016). Analyst coverage plays an important monitoring role in reducing earnings 
management and managerial expropriation (Yu 2008; Chen et al. 2015). Each of the three 
governance variables and their interactions with the change in cash is added into Eq. (1) 
one by one. The results are reported in columns 7–9 of Table 5. Consistent with prior lit-
erature, firms with low excess control rights, high institutional ownership and high ana-
lyst coverage have a higher value of cash. Significantly, the negative impact of government 
control on the value of cash still exists, which is above and beyond the impact of corporate 
governance.8
4.3  Why does government control lead to a lower value of cash?
As discussed earlier, the negative impact of government control on the value of cash may 
arise from two possible channels: One is from the high agency costs associated with politi-
cal objectives and managerial interests due to poor governance mechanisms, which we refer 
to as agency costs of political expropriation channel, and another is through low financial 
constraints inherited in firms under government control due to preferential access to credit 
provided by the government, which we refer to as financial constraints of the soft-budget 
effect channel. In this section, we investigate mechanisms through which the government 
control reduces the value of cash. Specifically, we examine how government affects a 
firm’s dissipation of cash holdings, financial constraints and external financing channels.
4.3.1  Government control and dissipation of cash holdings
According to the agency costs channel, cash holdings can be easily diverted by corpo-
rate insiders to be used in projects in accordance with political considerations, such as 
8 In considering that our results may be affected by changes in regulations and institutional development 
during the sample period, we identify two important events—the split share structure reform and the anti-
corruption campaign—and incorporate these two events into model specification. Our findings suggest that 
the negative impact of government control on the value of cash still holds. We would like to thank one of 
the referees for raising this point, and the results are available upon request.
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increasing employment rate and maintaining social stability and gaining national pride, 
rather than project merits. With poor monitoring systems, managers in government-con-
trolled firms are entrenched and may use free cash flows to overinvest in empire-build-
ing (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In line with the free cash flow hypothesis, prior studies 
find that excess cash and week governance schemes lead to increases in capital expend-
iture  (Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2014). The agency costs of political expropriation channel 
predict that firms under government control may increase the use of cash in subsequent 
investments, especially those with low investment efficiency (Jaslowitzer et al. 2016; Chen 
et al. 2017). In contrast, if the financial constraints channel holds, firms under government 
control may face a lower degree of financial constraints and have better access to exter-
nal financing, such as bank loans, and they are less likely to use internal finance, such as 
cash, for investments (Denis and Sibilkov 2009). Therefore, the financial constraints chan-
nel suggests that government control is less associated with the use of cash holdings in 
subsequent investment.
We test this premise by following Gao et al. (2013) to estimate a logit regression with 
the dependent variable being the increase in investment (INCR_INV), a dummy variable 
that takes value of one if a firm increases investment in the next year, and zero otherwise. 
The impact of government control on the use of cash in subsequent investment is indicated 
by the coefficient on the interaction between cash and government control (CASH × GOV). 
The agency costs (or financial constraints) channel implies that firms under government 
control are more (less) likely to increase the use of cash in subsequent investment, that is, 
a positive (negative) coefficient on the interaction. Controlling variables include Tobin’s Q 
(Q), firm size (SIZE), cash flow (CF), book leverage (BLEV), dividend dummy (DIV), sales 
growth (SG) and return on asset (ROA). The results are shown in Table 6, where investment 
is measured as capital expenditure in column 1, and the sum of capital expenditure and 
acquisitions in column 2. As evident, the coefficient on the interaction term between cash 
and government control is positive and statistically significant in both columns, support-
ing the agency costs channel, that firms with government control disgorge more cash via 
investments compared with privately controlled firms.
Next, we investigate whether firms with government control use cash to invest in pro-
jects associated with corporate innovation. The rationale of conducting this test is that if 
firms with government control invest in projects for political objectives, cash is less likely 
to be employed in innovation activities, such as R&D. The agency costs of political expro-
priation predict a negative relationship between cash and R&D in firms under government 
control, while the financial constraints of the soft-budget effect channel predicts no such 
relationship. To test for this, we define the increase in R&D (INCR_RD) as a dummy vari-
able that is equal to one if a firm increases R&D in the next year, and zero otherwise.9 The 
result is shown in column 3, where the coefficient on the interaction term CASH × GOV is 
negative and statistically significant, confirming our conjecture that firms under govern-
ment control are less likely to disgorge cash via innovation activities.
Finally, we test for the impact of government control on investment efficiency. The 
extant literature suggests that firms with government control may be obligated to invest in 
politically favored projects that are unprofitable, leading to investment inefficiency (Chen 
et al., 2011b). The agency costs channel suggests a negative impact of government control 
on investment efficiency, while the financial constraints channel does not. We follow Chen 
9 Since R&D data is only available from year 2007, observations in column 3 of Table 5 therefore reduce 
to 12,532.
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et al (2011b) and use the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities 
(Tobin’s Q) as a measure of investment efficiency. Results are reported in columns 4 and 
5 of Table 6. The results indicate that the coefficient on the interaction term, Q × GOV, is 
negative and highly significant when investment is measured as capital expenditure (col-
umn 4), the sum of capital expenditure and acquisitions (column 5). The negative impact 
of government control on the efficiency of investment further supports the agency costs of 
political expropriation associated with government control.
Taken together, the results reported in Table  6 support the agency costs of political 
expropriation channel in that the state uses corporate cash under its control to invest in 
Table 6  Disgorging cash via investment and investment efficiency
The table reports the results of disgorging cash via investment, R&D, and investment efficiency where 
Investment is measured as capital expenditure in columns 1 and 4, the sum of capital expenditure and acqui-
sitions in columns 2 and 5. The dependent variable is the increase in investment (INCR_INV) in columns 1 
and 2, the increase in R&D (INCR_RD) in column 3 and investment in columns 4 and 5. CASH and CF are 
deflated by total assets. The definitions of all variables are shown in Table 1. For all regressions, t-statistics 
(in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
Variable Increase in Investment Increase in R&D Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GOV − 0.054
(− 1.10)
− 0.037
(− 0.75)
− 0.136
(− 1.37)
− 0.004*
(− 1.90)
− 0.005**
(− 2.07)
CASH 0.809***
(5.19)
0.985***
(6.16)
1.224***
(4.52)
CASH × GOV 0.629***
(2.73)
0.584**
(2.48)
− 0.883**
(− 2.10)
Q × GOV − 0.002***
(− 2.59)
− 0.003***
(− 3.75)
Q 0.017
(1.29)
0.011
(0.87)
0.032
(1.50)
0.003***
(5.53)
0.005***
(8.06)
SIZE 0.004
(0.23)
− 0.003
(− 0.15)
0.022
(0.64)
0.001
(1.54)
0.002**
(2.26)
CF 0.077
(0.34)
− 0.202
(− 0.90)
− 0.560
(− 1.52)
0.101***
(14.48)
0.102***
(13.85)
BLEV − 0.398***
(− 3.57)
− 0.441***
(− 3.94)
− 0.138
(− 0.62)
0.063***
(13.11)
0.065***
(13.21)
DIV − 0.077**
(− 2.13)
− 0.077**
(− 2.12)
0.510***
(8.08)
0.017***
(14.57)
0.018***
(14.84)
SG 0.146***
(2.67)
0.076
(1.37)
0.454***
(5.65)
0.008***
(6.04)
0.0014***
(9.08)
ROA 2.747***
(7.87)
2.904***
(8.26)
3.014***
(5.15)
0.040***
(3.88)
0.035***
(3.23)
Constant − 0.305
(− 0.85)
− 0.146
(− 0.40)
− 3.693***
(− 5.03)
0.012
(0.76)
− 0.005
(− 0.32)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.28 0.16 0.16
Observations 16,682 16,682 12,532 19,321 19,321
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projects that mainly achieve political objectives, with less concerns on innovation and 
investment efficiency, leading to a lower value of cash for firms controlled by the gov-
ernment than by private owners. Our finding is consistent with Chen et  al. (2011b) and 
Chen et al. (2017), who demonstrate that the government control distorts firm investment 
behavior and harms investment efficiency. Similar, Jaslowitzer et al. (2016) find that state 
ownership restrains firms’ responsiveness to investment opportunities, and Boubakri et al. 
(2013a) contend that state ownership is negatively associated with corporate risk-taking.
4.3.2  Financial constraints and external financing channels
The evidence provided earlier suggests that the negative impact of government con-
trol on the value of cash is through agency costs of political expropriation. In this 
section, we conduct several direct tests showing that firms under government control 
may not be necessarily subject to the financial constraints of the soft-budget effect. 
Specifically, if the financial constraints channel is valid, government control should be 
expected to enhance corporate external financing ability and alleviate financial con-
straints. We measure the degree of financial constraints using cash flow sensitivity of 
cash, based on two models developed by Almeida et al. (2004),10 and external financ-
ing using gross equity issuance and net debt issuance, based on the model adopted by 
Firth et al. (2012). The financial constraints channel suggests a negative impact of gov-
ernment control on cash flow sensitivity of cash and a positive impact of government 
control on equity and debt issuances. The results for the cash flow sensitivity of cash 
are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7. It shows clearly that the coefficient on the 
interaction term between the government control and cash flow (GOV × CF) is not sta-
tistically significant in both cases, confirming our premise that firms under government 
control are not particularly subject to soft-budget on financial constraints compared 
to firms under private control. In terms of external financing for gross equity issu-
ance and net debt issuance, shown in columns 3 and 4, respectively, the coefficient on 
government control is negative in both cases; statistically significant for gross equity 
issuance; and marginally significant for net debt issuance, implying that government 
control has, in fact, a negative impact on external financing. Overall, our results are 
consistent with recent literature, suggesting that government control does not neces-
sarily enhance financing ability or mitigate financial constraints (Ben-Nasr et al. 2012; 
Firth et al. 2012; Borisova et al. 2015; Jaslowitzer et al. 2016).
Based on the evidence provided in this section, we conclude that the negative 
impact of government control on the value of cash is solely due to the severe agency 
costs related to the political expropriation, rather than financial constraints of the soft-
budget effect.
10 Compared with traditional measures of financial constraints, such as investment-cash flow sensitivity, 
cash flow sensitivity of cash can mitigate the concern of a noisy measure of Tobin’s Q. The intuition of 
this measure is that firms with financial constraints should increase their holdings of cash from cash flow to 
respond to future unexpected changes. The effect of financial constraints is captured by a positive sensitivity 
of cash flow to cash.
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5  The role of institutional development
Prior literature on cross-country analysis indicates that firms with close ties to govern-
ments benefit more from political connections in countries with poor institutional develop-
ment (Faccio 2006; Boubakri et al. 2012, 2013b). In terms of China, government control 
may be associated with more government-related contracts, fewer industry competitors and 
more growth opportunities (i.e. “helping hand”), especially in less developed regions due 
to a series of subsidization programs adopted to develop the local economy in recent years, 
Table 7  Government control, financial constraints and external financing channels
The table reports the results of government control, financial constraints, and external financing channels. 
The dependent variable is the change in cash (ΔCASH) in columns 1 and 2, gross equity issuance (GEI) in 
column 3 and net debt issuance (NDI) in column 4. Δ indicates the change from the previous year. All vari-
ables except GOV, SIZE, and AGE are deflated by total assets. The definitions of all variables are shown in 
Table 1. For all regressions, t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
Variable Financial constraints External financing channels
ΔCASH GEI NDI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GOV 0.009***
(5.43)
0.003*
(1.79)
− 0.011***
(− 7.25)
− 0.003*
(− 1.72)
CF 0.302***
(17.82)
0.312***
(18.71)
GOV × CF − 0.025
(− 1.18)
0.010
(0.50)
MB 0.006***
(8.19)
0.006***
(8.89)
− 0.001**
(− 1.97)
0.007***
(7.57)
SIZE 0.013***
(18.30)
0.012***
(19.11)
0.007***
(9.95)
0.012***
(12.01)
CAPEX − 0.412***
(− 29.29)
ΔNWC − 0.207***
(− 19.46)
ΔSTD 0.188***
(13.71)
ROA 0.017*
(1.75)
0.046***
(3.14)
BLEV − 0.022***
(− 4.96)
0.282***
(38.01)
AGE 0.003**
(2.40)
− 0.030***
(− 20.21)
Constant − 0.302***
(− 19.14)
− 0.266***
(− 18.78)
− 0.126***
(− 8.19)
− 0.232***
(− 11.10)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.14 0.28 0.03 0.21
Observations 16,636 16,636 16,636 16,636
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which may alleviate the agency conflicts of political objectives and entrenched managers. 
We test for this premise using a wide range of measures to proxy for market development 
and local government condition, which may affect the relationship between government 
control and value of cash. We expect that the negative impact of government control on 
the value of cash is mitigated in regions with low market development and poor govern-
ment condition, where the benefits of government control dominate the costs of govern-
ment control.
A number of indices, which are widely used in prior literature, are utilized to measure 
province-level institutional development (Firth et  al. 2009; Chen et  al. 2011a). First, the 
three measures of market development are: the overall market development (MKT); the lib-
eralization of the banking sector (BANK); and government decentralization in the economy 
(GOVT). All three measures are relative ranking indices compiled from the National Eco-
nomic Research Institute (NERI) under the auspices of the China Reform Foundation (Fan 
et al. 2011; Wang et al. 2017). The indices for the period 2003–2007 are collected from 
the NERI 2011 report (Fan et al. 2011), and those for the period 2008–2015 are extracted 
from the NERI 2016 report (Wang et al. 2017).11 Since the indices from the two reports are 
calculated on different base years (base year is 1997 for the NERI 2011 report and 2008 for 
the NERI 2016 report), we cannot use the values of the four indices directly. Instead, we 
focus on the ranking of provinces by each of the indices in each year.
In addition, we adopt use three proxies to measure local government and employment 
conditions, including the government overall fiscal condition (FISC), the government non-
arbitrary revenue (NADM) and employment conditions (EMP). FISC is the ratio of local 
government revenue to expense, and NADM is the percentage of local government non-
administrative revenue. EMP is one minus the unemployment rate. The data is extracted 
from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China. As argued by Chen et al. (2011a) 
and Cheung et al. (2010), regions with lower unemployment rates and less fiscal deficits 
and arbitrary revenues by local governments are more developed.
For each year, we divide our sample firms into two groups according to the median 
ranking or value of each institutional variable—firms with low/high market development 
and firms with poor/good government condition—and insert the institutional variable one 
by one to re-estimate our baseline model Eq. (1). We also add gross regional product (GRP) 
and its growth rate (GRPGRTH) to control for regional differences. The results are reported 
in Table 8. Consistent with our expectation, the negative impact of government control on 
the value of cash is more pronounced in regions with high market development as shown 
in columns 2, 4 and 6, and in regions with good government condition as displayed in 
columns 8, 10 and 12. The results suggest that in the region with high institutional develop-
ment, low government control leads to a high market value of cash. In areas that are less 
developed (columns 1, 3 and 5) and have a weak government condition (columns 7, 9 and 
11), the influence of government control on the value of cash is negative, however, but not 
statistically significant in five out of six cases. This finding can be interpreted such that 
the agency costs of political expropriation in the highly centralized area may be mitigated 
to some extent by the government-subsidized development programs, such as the western 
development strategy launched in late 1990, the north-east revival strategy in 2003 and the 
11 The NERI 2011 report covers the period 1997-2011, while the NERI 2016 report covers the period 
2008-2014. Since the ranking of provinces changes slowly, the data for 2015 is assumed to be the same as 
that in 2014 in this study. There are a few differences between the two reports. For example, the base years 
used are different. Some sub-indices are constructed differently. Further details can be found in NERI 2016 
report (Wang et al. 2017).
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rise of central China in more recent years, in order to improve the disparities of the eco-
nomic development across the provinces in China. Therefore, it appears that the benefits 
of government control offset the drawback of agency costs of political objectives, at least 
to some extent, in these regions. Our finding is largely consistent with Faccio (2006) and 
Boubakri et al. (2012; 2013b), who demonstrate that firms benefit from close connections 
to the state and such benefits are generally more pronounced in markets with relatively low 
institutional development and less efficient legal systems.
6  Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between government control and the value 
of cash held by firms. Using a large panel of listed firms in China during the period 
2003–2015, we find consistent evidence that government control results in a lower value of 
cash held by firms. Our finding is robust to the inclusion of year, industry and firm-specific 
effects, as well as different measures of key variables, and is insensitive to the inclusion 
of a set of additional control variables. The negative impact of government control on the 
value of cash remains valid after the endogeneity concerns are addressed carefully by using 
the lagged government control variable and a propensity-score matching sample, and by 
focusing on a group of firms that have transferred their ultimate control from government 
to private owner.
We sought to discover the mechanisms through which government control leads to a 
lower value of cash by exploring two channels: agency costs of political expropriation and 
financial constraints of the soft-budget effect. Our results appear to support the former, in 
that the cash is disgorged more in investment with lower investment efficiency, and less in 
R&D expenditure in firms under government control than those under the control of pri-
vate owners. We find no evidence that either supports government mitigation of financial 
constraints or enhancement of external financing abilities in listed firms under its control, 
suggesting that the negative impact of government control on the value of cash does not 
pertain to financial constraints of the soft-budget effect.
Finally, we find that the negative association between government control and the value 
of cash depends on regional development. In particular, our empirical evidence shows that 
this negative impact is mitigated to some extent in regions with low market development. 
Our finding appears to support the conjecture that the benefits of government control, in 
association with subsidizing policies, offset the costs of political expropriation in order to 
improve regional disparity in less developed regions.
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